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Abstract
In this paper, we set up and test a model of the Euro zone, with a spe-
cial emphasis on the role of money. The model follows the New Keynesian
DSGE framework, money being introduced in the utility function with a
non-separability assumption. By using bayesian estimation techniques,
we shed light on the determinants of output and ination, but also of the
interest rate, real money balances, exible-price output and exible-price
real money balances variances. The role of money is investigated further.
We nd that its impact on output depends on the degree of agentsrisk
aversion, increases with this degree, and becomes signicant when risk
aversion is high enough. The direct impact of the money variable on
ination variability is essentially minor whatever the risk aversion level,
the interest rate (monetary policy) being the overwhelming explanatory
factor.
Keywords: Euro Area, Bayesian Estimation, Money, DSGE.
JEL Classication: E31, E51, E58.
1 Introduction
Standard New Keynesian literature analyses monetary policy practically with-
out reference to monetary aggregates. In this now traditional framework, mon-
etary aggregates do not explicitly appear as an explanatory factor neither in
the output gap and ination dynamics nor in interest rate determination. In-
ation is explained by the expected ination rate and the output gap. In turn,
the output gap depends mainly on its expectations and the real rate of interest
(Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003; Galí and Gertler, 2007; Galí,
2008). Finally, the interest rate is established via a traditional Taylor rule in
function of the ination gap and the output gap.
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In this framework, monetary policy impacts aggregate demand and thus in-
ation and output, through change in the real interest rate. An increase in the
interest rate reduces output, which increases the output gap, thus decreases in-
ation until a new equilibrium is reached. The money stock and money demand
do not explicitly appear. The central bank sets the nominal interest rate so as
to satisfy the demand for money (Woodford, 2003; Ireland, 2004).
This view of the transmission mechanism neglects the behavior of real money
balances. First, there may exist a real balance e¤ect on aggregate demand re-
sulting from a change in prices. Second, as individuals re-allocate their portfolio
of assets, the behavior of real money balances induces relative price adjustments
on nancial and real assets. In the process, aggregate demand changes, and thus
output. By a¤ecting aggregate demand, real money balances become part of
the transmission mechanism. Hence, interest rate alone is not su¢ cient to ex-
plain the impact of monetary policy and the role played by nancial markets
(Meltzer, 1995, 1999, Brunner and Meltzer, 1968).
This monetarist transmission process may also imply a specic role to real
money balances when dealing with risk aversion. When risk aversion increases,
individuals may desire to hold more money balances to face the implied uncer-
tainty and to optimize their consumption through time. Friedman alluded to
this process as far back as 1956 (Friedman, 1956). If this hypothesis holds, risk
aversion may inuence the impact of real money balances on relative prices,
nancial assets and real assets, hence on aggregate demand and output.
Other considerations as to the role of money are worth mentioning. In a New
Keynesian framework, the expected ination rate or the output gap may "hide"
the role of monetary aggregates, for example on ination determination. Nelson
(2008) shows that standard New Keynesian models are built on the strange
assumption that central banks can control the long-term interest rate, while
this variable is actually determined by a Fisher equation in which expected
ination depends on monetary developments. Reynard (2007) found that in
the U.S. and the Euro area, monetary developments provide qualitative and
quantitative information as to ination. Assenlacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2006)
conrm that money growth contains information about ination pressures and
may play an informational role as to the state of di¤erent non observed (or
di¢ cult to observe) variables inuencing ination or output.
How is money generally introduced in New Keynesian DSGE models ? The
standard way is to resort to money-in-the-utility (MIU) function, whereby real
money balances are supposed to a¤ect the marginal utility of consumption.
Kremer, Lombardo, and Werner (2003) seem to support this non-separability
assumption for Germany, and imply that real money balances contribute to
the determination of output and ination dynamics. A recent contribution
introduces the role of money with adjustment costs for holding real balances, and
shows that real money balances contribute to explain expected future variations
of the natural interest rate in the U.S. and the Euro area (Andrés, López-Salido
and Nelson, 2009). Nelson (2002) nds that money is a signicant determinant
of aggregate demand, both in the U.S. and in the U.K. However, the empirical
work undertaken by Ireland (2004), Andrés, López-Salido, and Vallés (2006),
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and Jones and Stracca (2008) suggests that there is little evidence as to the role
of money in the cases of the United States, the Euro zone, and the UK.
Our paper di¤ers in its empirical conclusion, giving a stronger role to money,
at least in the Euro zone. It di¤ers also somewhat in its theoretical set up. As
in the standard way, we resort to money-in-the-utility function (MIU) with a
non-separability assumption. Yet, in our framework, we specify all the micro-
parameters. This specication permits to extract characteristics and implica-
tions of this type of model that cannot be extracted if only aggregated para-
meters are used. We will see, for example, that the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion plays a signicant role in explaining the role of money.
Our model di¤ers also in its ination and output dynamics. Standard New
Keynesian DSGE models give an important role to endogenous inertia on both
output (consumption habits) and ination (price indexation). In fact, both dy-
namics may have a stronger forward-looking component than an inertial com-
ponent. And this appears to be the case at least in the Euro area, if not clearly
in the U.S. (Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido, 2001). These inertial components
may hide part of the role of money. Hence, our choice to remain as simple
as possible on that respect in order to try to unveil a possible role for money
balances.
We di¤er also from the empirical analyses of the Euro zone by using bayesian
techniques in a New Keynesian DSGE framework like in Smets and Wouters
(2007), while introducing money in the model. We also estimate all micro-
parameters of the model, whereas current literature attempts to introduce money
only by aggregating of some of these parameters, therefore leaving aside relevant
information.
A simulation of the model is conducted in order to analyse the consequences
of structural shocks. In the process we unveil transmission mechanisms generally
neglected in traditional New Keynesian analyses. This framework highlights in
particular the non-negligible role of money in explaining output variations, given
a high enough risk aversion. It also highlights the overwhelming role of monetary
policy in ination variability.
The dynamic analysis of the model furthermore sheds light on the change in
the role of money in explaining short run uctuations in output as risk aversion
changes. It shows that the higher the risk aversion, the higher the role of money
in the transmission process.
Section 2 of the paper describes the theoretical set up. In Section 3, the
model is calibrated and estimated with bayesian techniques and by using Euro
area data. Impulse response functions and variance decompositions are analyzed
in Section 4, with an emphasis on the impact of the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The model consists of households that supply labor, purchase goods for con-
sumption, hold money and bonds, and rms that hire labor and produce and
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sell di¤erentiated products in monopolistically competitive goods markets. Each
rm sets the price of the good it produces, but not all rms reset their price
during each period. Households and rms behave optimally: households max-
imize the expected present value of utility, and rms maximize prots. There
is also a central bank that controls the nominal rate of interest. This model is
inspired by Galí (2008), Walsh (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2003).
2.1 Households
We assume a representative innitely-lived household, seeking to maximize
Et
" 1X
k=0
kUt+k
#
(1)
where Ut is the period utility function and  < 1 is the discount factor.
We assume the existence of a continuum of goods represented by the interval
[0; 1]. The household decides how to allocate its consumption expenditures
among the di¤erent goods. This requires that the consumption index Ct be
maximized for any given level of expenditures1 . Furthermore, and conditional
on such optimal behavior, the period budget constraint takes the form
PtCt +Mt +QtBt  Bt 1 +WtNt +Mt 1 (2)
for t = 0; 1; 2:::, where Wt is the nominal wage, Pt is an aggregate price index,
Nt is hours of work (or the measure of household members employed), Bt is the
quantity of one-period nominally riskless discount bonds purchased in period t
and maturing in period t + 1 (each bond pays one unit of money at maturity
and its price is Qt where it =   logQt is the short term nominal rate) andMt is
the quantity of money holdings at time t. The above sequence of period budget
constraints is supplemented with a solvency condition2 .
In the literature, utility functions are usually time-separable. To introduce
an explicit role for money balances, we drop the assumption that household
preferences are time-separable across consumption and real money balances.
Preferences are measured with a CES utility function including real money
balances. Under the assumption of a period utility given by
Ut = e
"Pt
0@ 1
1  
 
(1  b)C1 t + be"
M
t

Mt
Pt
1 ! 1 1 
  e
"Nt N1+t
1 + 
1A (3)
consumption, labor, money and bond holdings are chosen to maximize (1) sub-
ject to (2) and the solvency condition. This CES utility function depends pos-
itively on the consumption of goods, Ct, positively on real money balances,
Mt=Pt, and negatively on labour Nt.  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
1See Appendix 6.1
2Such as 8t lim
n !1Et [Bn]  0. It prevents engaging in Ponzi-type schemes.
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of households (or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), 
is the inverse of the elasticity of money holdings with respect to the interest
rate, and  is the inverse of the elasticity of work e¤ort with respect to the real
wage. The utility function also contains three structural shocks: "pt is a general
shock to preferences that a¤ects the intertemporal substitution of households
(preference shock), "mt is a money demand shock and "
n
t is a shock to the num-
ber of hours worked. All structural shocks are assumed to follow a rst-order
autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error term. b and  are positive
scale parameters.
This setting leads to the following conditions3 , which, in addition to the
budget constraint, must hold in equilibrium. The resulting log-linear version
of the rst order condition corresponding to the demand for contingent bonds
implies that
c^t = Et [c^t+1]  1
   a1 (   ) (^{t   Et [^t+1]) (4)
  (1  a1) (   )
   a1 (   ) (Et [m^t+1   Et [^t+1]]) + t;c
where t;c =   1 a1( )Et

"Pt+1
   (1 a1)( ) a1( ) 11 Et "Mt+1 and by using
the steady state of the rst order conditions a 11 = 1+

b
1 b
 1

(1  )  1 . The
lowercase (^) denotes the log-linearized (around the steady state) form of the
original aggregated variables.
The demand for cash that follows from the households optimization problem
is given by
  (m^t   p^t) + c^t + "Mt = a2 {^t (5)
with a2 = 1exp( 1 ) 1
and where real cash holdings depend positively on consump-
tion with an elasticity equal to unity and negatively on the nominal interest rate.
In what follows we will take the nominal interest rate as the central banks pol-
icy instrument. In the literature, due to the assumption that consumption and
real money balances are additively separable in the utility function, cash hold-
ings do not enter any of the other structural equations: accordingly, the above
equation becomes recursive to the rest of the system of equations.
The rst order condition corresponding to the optimal consumption-leisure
arbitrage implies that
n^t + (   a1 (   )) c^t   (   ) (1  a1) (m^t   p^t) + t;n = w^t   p^t (6)
where t;n =   ( )(1 a1)1  "Mt + "Nt .
Finally, these equations represent the Euler condition for the optimal in-
tratemporal allocation of consumption (equation (4)), the intertemporal opti-
mality condition setting the marginal rate of substitution between money and
3See Appendix 6.3
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consumption equal to the opportunity cost of holding money (equation (5)), and
the intratemporal optimality condition setting the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption equal to the real wage4 (equation (6)).
2.2 Firms
We assume a continuum of rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Each rm produces a dif-
ferentiated good but uses an identical technology with the following production
function5 ,
Yt (i) = AtNt (i)
1  (7)
where At is the level of technology, assumed to be common to all rms and to
evolve exogenously over time, and  is the measure of decreasing returns.
All rms face an identical isoelastic demand schedule, and take the aggregate
price level Pt and aggregate consumption index Ct as given. As in the standard
Calvo (1983) model, our generalization features monopolistic competition and
staggered price setting. At any time t, only a fraction 1    of rms, with
0 <  < 1, can reset their prices optimally, while the remaining rms index
their prices to lagged ination6 .
2.3 Price dynamics
Lets assume a set of rms not reoptimizing their posted price in period t. Using
the denition of the aggregate price level7 and the fact that all rms resetting
prices choose an identical price P t , leads to Pt =
h
P 1 "t 1 + (1  ) (P t )1 "
i 1
1 "
.
Dividing both sides by Pt 1 and log-linearizing around P t = Pt 1 yields
t = (1  ) (pt   pt 1) (8)
In this setup, we dont assume inertial dynamics of prices. Ination results
from the fact that rms reoptimizing in any given period their price plans, choose
a price that di¤ers from the economys average price in the previous period.
2.4 Price setting
A rm reoptimizing in period t chooses the price P t that maximizes the current
market value of the prots generated while that price remains e¤ective. This
problem is solved and leads to a rst-order Taylor expansion around the zero
ination steady state:
pt   pt 1 = (1  )
1X
k=0
()
k
Et
cmct+kjt + (pt+k   pt 1) (9)
4See Appendix 6.2
5For simplicity reasons, we assume a production function without capital.
6Thus, each period, 1   producers reset their prices, while a fraction  keep their prices
unchanged.
7As shown in Appendix 6.1
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where cmct+kjt = mct+kjt  mc denotes the log deviation of marginal cost from
its steady state value mc =  , and  = log ("= ("  1)) is the log of the desired
gross markup.
2.5 Equilibrium
Market clearing in the goods market requires Yt (i) = Ct (i) for all i 2 [0; 1] and
all t. Aggregate output is dened as Yt =
R 1
0
Yt (i)
1  1" di
 "
" 1
; it follows that
Yt = Ct must hold for all t. One can combine the above goods market clear-
ing condition with the consumers Euler equation (4) to yield the equilibrium
condition
y^t = Et [y^t+1]  1
   a1 (   ) (^{t   Et [^t+1]) (10)
+
(   ) (1  a1)
   a1 (   ) (Et [m^t+1]  Et [^t+1]) + t;c
Market clearing in the labor market requires Nt =
R 1
0
Nt (i) di. By using the
production function (7) and taking logs, one can write the following approximate
relation between aggregate output, employment and technology as
yt = at + (1  )nt (11)
An expression is derived for an individual rms marginal cost in terms of
the economys average real marginal cost:
mct = (w^t   p^t)  dmpnt (12)
= (w^t   p^t)  1
1   (a^t   y^t) (13)
for all t, where dmpnt denes the economys average marginal product of labor.
As mct+kjt = (w^t+k   p^t+k) mpnt+kjt we have
mct+kjt = mct+k   "
1   (p

t   pt+k) (14)
where the second equality8 follows from the demand schedule combined with
the market clearing condition ct = yt . Substituting (14) into (9) yields
pt   pt 1 = (1  )
1X
k=0
()
k
Et [cmct+k] + 1X
k=0
()
k
Et [t+k] (15)
where  = 1 1 +"  1.
8Note that under the assumption of constant returns to scale ( = 0), mct+kjt = mct+k,
i.e., the marginal cost is independent of the level of production and, hence, is common across
rms.
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Finally, (8) and (15) yield the ination equation
t = Et [t+1] + mccmct (16)
where , mc = 
(1 )(1 )
 . mc is strictly decreasing in the index of price
stickiness , in the measure of decreasing returns , and in the demand elasticity
".
Next, a relation is derived between the economys real marginal cost and
a measure of aggregate economic activity. From (6) and (11), the average real
marginal cost can be expressed as
mct =

   (   ) a1 +  + 
1  

y^t   a^t

1 + 
1  

(17)
+(   ) (1  a1) (m^t   p^t) + t;n
Under exible prices the real marginal cost is constant and equal tomc =  .
Dening the natural level of output, denoted by yft , as the equilibrium level of
output under exible prices leads to
mc =

   (   ) a1 +  + 
1  

y^ft   a^t

1 + 
1  

(18)
+(   ) (1  a1) cmpft + t;n
where cmpft = m^ft   p^ft , thus implying
y^ft = 
y
aa^t + 
y
mcmpft + yc + ysm"Mt + ysn"Nt (19)
where
ya =
1 + 
(   (   ) a1) (1  ) +  + 
ym =
(1  ) (   ) (1  a1)
(   (   ) a1) (1  ) +  + 
yc =  
 (1  )
(   (   ) a1) (1  ) +  + 
ysm =
(   ) (1  a1) (1  )
(   (   ) a1) (1  ) +  + 
1
1  
ysn =  
1  
(   (   ) a1) (1  ) +  + 
We deduce from (10) that {^ft = (   (   ) a1)Et
h
y^ft+1
i
and by using (5)
we obtain the following equation of real money balances under exible prices
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cmpft = my+1Et hy^ft+1i+ my y^ft + 1 "Mt (20)
where my+1 =  a2( ( )a1) and my = 1 + a2( ( )a1)
Subtracting (18) from (17) yields
cmct =  x y^t   y^ft +  m cmpt   cmpft  (21)
where cmpt = m^t  p^t is the log linearized real money balances around its steady
state, cmpft is its exible-price counterpart,  x =    (   ) a1 + +1  and
 m = (   ) (1  a1).
By combining (21) with (16) we obtain
^t = Et [^t+1] + x

y^t   y^ft

+ m
cmpt   cmpft  (22)
where y^t   y^ft is the output gap, cmpt   cmpft is the real money balances gap,
x =
1  
1  + "

1  


(1  )

   (   ) a1 +  + 
1  

and
m =
1  
1  + "

1  


(1  ) (   ) (1  a1)
Then (22) is our rst equation relating ination to its one period ahead
forecast, the output gap and real money balances.
The second key equation describing the equilibrium of the model is obtained
by rewriting (10) so as to determine output
y^t = Et [y^t+1]  r (^{t   Et [^t+1]) + mpEt

cmpt+1+ zxt (23)
where r = 1 ( )a1 , mp =
( )(1 a1)
 a1( ) and z
x
t = t;c = spEt

"Pt+1

+smEt

"Mt+1

where sp =   1 a1( ) and sm =  
(1 a1)( )
 a1( )
1
1  . (23) is
thus a dynamic IS equation including the real money balances.
The third key equation describes the behavior of the money stock. From (5)
we obtain cmpt = y^t   i {^t + zmt (24)
where i = a2= and zmt =
1
 "
M
t .
The last equation determines the interest rate through a standard smoothed
Taylor-type rule:
{^t = (1  i)

 (^t   ) + x

y^t   y^ft

+ i {^t 1 + zit (25)
where  and x are policy coe¢ cients reecting the weight on ination and
on the output gap; the parameter 0 < i < 1 captures the degree of interest
rate smoothing. zit is an exogenous ad hoc shock accounting for uctuations of
the nominal interest rate such that zit = iz
i
t 1 + "i;t with "i;t  N (0;i). To
simplify, we assume that the target ination rate is equal to zero, i.e.  = 0.
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3 Estimation
As Schorfheide (1999) or Smets and Wouters (2003), we apply Bayesian tech-
niques to estimate our DSGE model. Contrary to Ireland (2004) or Andrès
et al. (2006), we did not choose to estimate our model by using the maxi-
mum of likelihood because such computation hardly converges toward a global
maximum.
3.1 DSGE model
Our model consists of six equations and six dependent variables: ination, nom-
inal interest rate, output, exible-price output, real money balances and its
exible-price counterpart. Flexible-price output and exible-price real money
balances are completely determined by shocks: exible-price output is mainly
driven by technology shocks (whereas uctuations in the output gap can be
attributed to supply and demand shocks) whereas the exible-price real money
balances is mainly driven by money shocks and exible-price output.
y^ft = 
y
aa^t + 
y
mcmpft   yc + ysm"Mt + ysn"Nt (26)
cmpft = my+1Et hy^ft+1i+ my y^ft + 1 "Mt (27)
^t = Et [^t+1] + x

y^t   y^ft

+ m
cmpt   cmpft  (28)
y^t = Et [y^t+1]  r (^{t   Et [^t+1]) + mpEt

cmpt+1 (29)
+spEt

"Pt+1

+ smEt

"Mt+1

(30)
cmpt = y^t   i {^t + 1 "Mt (31)
{^t = (1  i)

 (^t   ) + x

y^t   y^ft

+ i {^t 1 + iz
i
t 1 + "i;t (32)
where
ya =
1+
( ( )a1)(1 )++ x =
(1 )(1 )( ( )a1+ +1  )
1 +"
1 

ym =
(1 )( )(1 a1)
( ( )a1)(1 )++ m =
(1 )(1 )( )(1 a1)
1 +"
1 

yc =
log( "" 1 )(1 )
( ( )a1)(1 )++ r =
1
 a1( )
ysm =
( )(1 a1)(1 )
( ( )a1)(1 )++
1
1  mp =
( )(1 a1)
 a1( )
ysn =   1 ( ( )a1)(1 )++ sp =   1 a1( )
my+1 =  a2( ( )a1) sm =   (1 a1)( ) a1( ) 11 
my = 1 +
a2( ( )a1)
 i =
a2

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with a1 = 1
1+( b1 b )
1
 (1 )  1
and a2 = 1exp( 1 ) 1
.
A static analysis of these coe¢ cients is provided in Appendix 6.7.
3.2 Euro Area data
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Short Term Interest Rate
In this model of the Euro zone, ^t is the log-linearized ination rate measured
as the quarter to quarter change in the GDP Deator, y^t is the log-linearized
output measured as the quarter to quarter change in the GDP, and it is the
short-term (3-month) nominal interest rate. These Data are extracted from the
Euro Area Wide Model database (AWM) of Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001).cmpt is the log-linearized quarter to quarter growth rate of real money balances.
We use the M3 monetary aggregate from the OECD database. y^ft , the trend of
the log-linearized output, and cmpft , the trend of the log-linearized growth rate
of real money balances, are completely determined by structural shocks.
Structural shocks ("Pt , "
N
t , and "
M
t ), the exogenous component of the interest
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rate ("it) and of the productivity ("
a
t ) are assumed to follow a rst-order autore-
gressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error term such as "kt = k"
k
t 1 + !k;t
where "k;t  N (0;k) for k = fP;N;M; i; ag.
3.3 Calibration and results
In order to obtain bayesian estimates of all the structural parameters of the
model, we need to calibrate the mean and the probability distribution of these
parameters. Following Smets and Wouters (2005) and Galí (2007), we linearize
the equations describing the model around the steady state and we choose prior
distributions for the parameters which are added to the likelihood function9 ;
the estimation of the implied posterior distribution of the parameters is done
using the Metropolis algorithm (see Smets and Wouters, 2007, and Adolfson et
al., 2007).
Table 1: Calibration and estimation of structural parameters10
Law Prior Posterior Posterior Standard Condence
mean deviation mean deviation interval
 beta 0:99 0:005 0:9933 0:0026 [0:9879; 0:9988]
 normal 2:0 0:05 1:9746 0:0503 [1:8966; 2:0593]
 normal 1:2 0:05 1:3271 0:0378 [1:2647; 1:3915]
 normal 1:0 0:05 1:0079 0:0498 [0:9219; 1:0884]
 beta 0:66 0:05 0:7645 0:0281 [0:7181; 0:8138]
" normal 6:0 0:05 6:0029 0:0500 [5:9226; 6:0867]
 beta 0:33 0:05 0:3921 0:0539 [0:3050; 0:4792]
b beta 0:4 0:05 0:3981 0:0508 [0:3209; 0:4810]
i beta 0:6 0:05 0:5346 0:0356 [0:4748; 0:5923]
 normal 3:5 0:05 3:5154 0:0499 [3:4329; 3:5965]
x normal 1:5 0:05 1:5288 0:0493 [1:4458; 1:6086]
a beta 0:8 0:075 0:8600 0:0360 [0:7829; 0:9440]
i beta 0:8 0:075 0:9892 0:0039 [0:9824; 0:9962]
p beta 0:8 0:075 0:8841 0:0167 [0:8580; 0:9102]
m beta 0:8 0:075 0:9389 0:0177 [0:9117; 0:9680]
n beta 0:8 0:075 0:8105 0:0776 [0:6819; 0:9455]
a invgamma 1 1 0:8976 0:0914 [0:6269; 1:1568]
i invgamma 1 1 0:6118 0:0660 [0:4953; 0:7232]
p invgamma 5 1 7:2887 0:8491 [5:9397; 8:7002]
m invgamma 1 1 1:4097 0:1016 [1:2402; 1:5757]
n invgamma 1 1 1:2876 0:2204 [0:3410; 2:4605]
Results are based on 10 chains, each with 100000 draws based on the Metropolis algorithm.
Following standard conventions, we choose beta distributions for parameters
that fall between zero and one, inverted gamma distributions for parameters
9The solution takes the form of a state-space model that is used to compute the likelihood
function.
10See Appendix 6.5 for the prior and posterior distributions.
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that need to be constrained to be greater than zero, and normal distributions
in other cases. As in Smets and Wouters (2003), the standard errors of the
innovations are assumed to follow inverse gamma distributions and we choose a
beta distribution for shock persistence parameters (as well as for the backward
component of the Taylor rule) with 0:8 mean and 0:05 standard error. We
estimate the model with 106 observations from 1980 (Q4) to 2007 (Q2) in order
to avoid high volatility periods before 1980 and during the latest nancial crisis.
The estimates of the macro-parameters (aggregated structural parameters)
are
ya = 0:79327 x = 0:06334
ym =  0:02733 m = 0:00173
yc = 0:04376 r = 0:53741
ysm = 0:08356 mp = 0:06116
ysn =  0:236 68 sp =  0:53741
my+1 =  0:80737 sm =  0:18698
my = 1:8074 i = 0:43389
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4 Interpretation
4.1 Impulse response functions
The impulse response functions of all structural shocks are as follows.
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
Inflation
%
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
Output
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
Nominal Interest Rate
%
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
Real Money Balances
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
Real Interest Rate
%
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
Output Gap
0 10 20 30 40
-0.5
0
0.5
Real Money Growth
Quarters
%
0 10 20 30 40
0
5
10
Preference Shock
Quarters
Figure 1: Preference shock
Figure 1 presents the response of key variables to a preference shock. In
response to the shock, the ination rate, the output, the output gap, real money
balances, the nominal and the real rate of interest rise; real money growth
displays a little overshooting process in the rst periods, then returns quickly
to its steady state value.
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Figure 2: Technology shock
In Figure 2, we plot the response of the same variables to a technology shock.
The output gap, the ination, the nominal and the real interest rate decrease
whereas output as well as real money balances and real money growth rise.
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Figure 3: Money shock
Figure 3 exhibits the response to a money shock. Ination, the nominal and
the real rate of interest, the output and the output gap rise.
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Figure 4: Interest rate shock
Figure 4 presents the response to an interest rate shock. Ination, the nomi-
nal rate of interest, output and the output gap fall. The real rate of interest rises.
A positive monetary policy shock induces a fall in interest rates due to a low
enough degree of intertemporal substitution (i.e. the risk aversion parameter is
high enough) which generates a large impact response of current consumption
relative to future consumption. This result has been noted in, inter alia, Jeanne
(1994) and Christiano et al. (1997).
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Figure 5: Labor shock
When there is a labor shock (Figure 5), ination, the real and the nominal
rate of interest, and the output gap increase. Output and real money balances
decrease.
All these results are in line with the DSGE literature, especially with Galí
(2007) and other studies on impulse response functions.
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4.2 Variance decompositions
Here we analyze in two di¤erent ways the forecast error variance of each variable
following exogenous shocks. The analysis is conducted rst via an unconditional
variance decomposition (Table 3), and second via a conditional variance decom-
position (Figures 6 to 17).
Table 3: Unconditional variance decomposition (%)
With  = 2 With  = 6
"Nt "
P
t "
i
t "
M
t "
a
t "
N
t "
P
t "
i
t "
M
t "
a
t
y^t 6:19 15:6 25:7 4:47 48:1 0:20 10:1 22:6 17:0 50:2
^t 0:00 0:77 99:2 0:00 0:03 0:00 0:37 99:3 0:01 0:36
{^t 0:21 25:5 73:3 0:03 0:98 0:14 21:1 67:7 0:26 10:8cmpt 1:77 0:77 1:27 83:2 13:0 0:12 0:58 0:13 76:4 22:8
y^ft 11:8 0:00 0:00 5:67 82:6 0:55 0:00 0:00 16:5 82:9cmpft 2:37 0:00 0:00 82:2 15:5 0:25 0:00 0:00 72:1 27:7
The unconditional variance decomposition shows that with a standard cali-
bration of our model ( = 2), about half of the variance of output results from
the productivity shock, about a quarter from the interest rate shock, the re-
maining quarter from the other shocks. If money plays some role, this role is
rather minor (an impact of less than 5%).
Yet, as Table 3 shows, the money shock contribution to the business cycle
depends on the value of agents risk aversion. Indeed, an estimation of our
model with a higher risk aversion11 ( = 6) gives interesting information as to
the role of money, and more generally as to the role of each shock.
Notably, it shows that a higher coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion increases
signicantly the role of money in a business cycle.
11See Appendix 6.4, Table 4.
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Figure 6: Forecast error variance decomposition of y^t with  = 2
Figure 7: Forecast error variance decomposition of y^t with  = 6
If about half of the variance of output is still explained by the productivity
shock, the role of the interest rate shock and especially the role of preference and
labor shocks decrease notably whereas the impact of the money shock increases
from about 4% to 17%, i.e. is multiplicated by a factor of four.
The analysis through time (Figures 6 and 7) also shows that the impact of
the money shock, and especially of the interest rate shock, increases a bit with
the time horizon whereas it is the reverse for the preference shock.
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Figure 8: Forecast error variance decomposition of ^t with  = 2
Figure 9: Forecast error variance decomposition of ^t with  = 6
A look at the conditional and unconditional ination variance decomposition
shows the overwhelming role of the interest rate shock (the monetary policy
shock) which explains more than 99% of the variance. It must be noted that
the change in risk aversion (when  goes from 2 to 6) does not a¤ect this
result, and there is no signicant change of the respective impacts through time
(Figures 8 and 9).
21
Figure 10: Forecast error variance decomposition of {^t with  = 2
Figure 11: Forecast error variance decomposition of {^t with  = 6
The interest rate variance is dominated by the direct shock on the interest
rate. Yet, as risk aversion increases, the role of the productivity shock increases.
The relative importance of each of these shocks changes through time (Figures
10 and 11). Over short horizons, the preference shock explains almost 70% of
the nominal interest rate variance whereas the interest rate shock explains less
than 20%. For longer horizons, there is an inversion: the nominal interest rate
shock explains close to 70% of the variance and the preference shock a bit more
than 20%.
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Figure 12: Forecast error variance decomposition of cmpt with  = 2
Figure 13: Forecast error variance decomposition of cmpt with  = 6
Table 3 as well as Figures 12 and 13 show that real money balances are mainly
explained by the real money balances shock and the productivity shock, with
a small increase in the role of the productivity shock as risk aversion increases.
The respective role of these two shocks barely changes through time.
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Figure 14: Forecast error variance decomposition of y^ft with  = 2
Figure 15: Forecast error variance decomposition of y^ft with  = 6
It is also interesting to notice that the same type of analysis applies to the
exible-price output variance decomposition (Figures 14 and 15). Productivity
is the main explanatory factor with a weight greater than 82%, the role of money
increasing also with the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient (from a weight of about
6% to almost 17%) whereas monetary policy plays no role and labor only a
minor one.
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Figure 16: Forecast error variance decomposition of cmpft with  = 2
Figure 17: Forecast error variance decomposition of cmpft with  = 6
As Figures 16 and 17 show, the exible-price real balances variance is mainly
explained by the money shock, with a signicant impact of the productivity
shock. The impact of each of these shocks does not vary much through time, but
when risk aversion increases the impact of the productivity shock also increases.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we built and empirically tested a model of the Euro zone, with a
special emphasis on the role of money. The model follows the New Keynesian
DSGE framework, but with money in the utility function whereby real money
balances a¤ect the marginal utility of consumption. By using bayesian estima-
tion techniques, we shed light on the determinants of output and ination, but
also of interest rate, real money balances, exible-price output and exible-price
real money balances variances. On that respect we further investigate the role
of money, especially when intertemporal risk aversion changes.
Half of the variance of output is explained by the productivity shock, the
other half by a combination of labor, preference, interest rate and money shocks.
Almost the totality of the ination variance is a consequence of the interest rate
shock. The interest rate variance depends mainly on the interest rate shock,
but the preference shock is also signicant, as well as, to a lesser extent, the
productivity shock. Real balances react essentially to money shocks, with a
signicant role left to the productivity shock. Interestingly, the exible-price
output variability depends strongly on the productivity shock, but the money
shock remains signicant. The exible-price real balances variance is mainly
explained by the money shock, with a signicant impact of the productivity
shock. These results are sensible and rather in line with prior expectations. We
believe that this corroborates the credibility of our model.
To investigate further the role of each shock, especially the money shock, we
calibrated the model with di¤erent risk aversion coe¢ cients.
The rst calibration of the model with a standard risk aversion shows that
money plays a minor role in explaining output variability, a result in line with
current literature (Andrès et al., 2006; Ireland, 2004). Other calibrations with
higher risk aversion imply that money plays a non-negligible role in explaining
output uctuations. And the more agents are risk averse, the higher the impact
of money on output. This result di¤ers from existing literature using New
Keynesian DSGE frameworks with money, neglecting the role of a high enough
risk factor.
On the other hand, the explicit money variable does not appear to have a
notable direct role in explaining ination variability, the overwhelming explana-
tory factor being the interest rate (monetary policy) whatever the level of risk
aversion.
If these results are trustworthy, it can be inferred that the last nancial crisis,
by changing economic agentsperception of risks, may have increased the role
of real money balances in the transmission mechanisms and in output changes.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Aggregate consumption and price index
Let Ct =
R 1
0
Ct (i)
1  1" di
 "
" 1
be a consumption index where Ct (i) represents
the quantity of good i consumed by the household in period t. This requires
that Ct be maximized for any given level of expenditures
R 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i) di where
Pt (i) is the price of good i at time t. The maximization of Ct for any given
expenditure level
R 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i) di = Zt can be formalized by means of the
Lagrangian
L =
Z 1
0
Ct (i)
1  1" di
 "
" 1
  
Z 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i) di  Zt

(33)
The associated rst-order conditions are Ct (i)
  1" C
1

t = Pt (i) for all i 2
[0; 1]. Thus, for any two goods (i; j),
Ct (i) = Ct (j)

Pt (i)
Pt (j)
 "
(34)
which can be substituted into the expression for consumption expenditures to
yield Ct (i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 "
Zt
Pt
for all i 2 [0; 1] where Pt =
R 1
0
Pt (i)
1 "
di
 1
1 "
is
an aggregate price index. The latter condition can then be substituted into the
denition of Ct to obtain Z 1
0
Pt (i)Ct (i) di = PtCt (35)
Combining the two previous equations yields the demand schedule equation
Ct (i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 "
Ct for all i 2 [0; 1].
6.2 Optimization problem
Our Lagrangian is given by
Lt = Et
" 1X
k=0
kUt+k   t+kVt+k
#
(36)
where
Vt = Ct +
Mt
Pt
+Qt
Bt
Pt
  Bt 1
Pt
  Wt
Pt
Nt   Mt 1
Pt
(37)
and
Ut = e
"Pt
 
1
1  X
1 
t  
e"
N
t N1+t
1 + 
!
(38)
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where Xt =

(1  b)C1 t + be"
M
t

Mt
Pt
1  11 
is the non-separable part of
the utility function.
The rst order condition related to consumption expenditures is given by
t = e
"Pt (1  b)C t X t (39)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint at
time t.
The rst order condition corresponding to the demand for contingent bonds
implies that
Qt = Et

t+1
t
Pt
Pt+1

(40)
The demand for cash that follows from the households optimization problem
is given by
be"
M
t e"
P
t

Mt
Pt
 
X t = t   Et

t+1
Pt
Pt+1

(41)
which can be naturally interpreted as a demand for real balances. The latter is
increasing in consumption and inversely related to the nominal interest rate, as
in conventional specications.
e"
P
t e"
N
t Nt = t
Wt
Pt
(42)
6.3 Log linearization
Log linearizing the Lagrangian multiplier (39) around its steady state yields
^t = "
P
t   c^t + (   )

a1c^t + (1  a1)

m^t   p^t + 1
1   "
M
t

(43)
where a1 =
(1 b)C1 
(1 b)C1 +b(MP )
1  is a constant term where C and MP are respec-
tively consumption and real money balances at the steady state12 . We obtain
from (39), (40) and (41) the following expression for a1
a1 =
1
1 +

b
1 b
 1

(1  )  1
Log linearizing (40) around its steady state yields (with Qt = e it)
 {^t = Et
"
"Pt+1 + (a1 (   )  )c^t+1
+(1  a1) (   )

m^t+1  p^t+1 + 11 "Mt+1

  ^t+1
#
(44)
12 In order to determine (43), (44) and (46), we need to log linearize Xt around its steady
state: X^t = a1c^t + (1  a1)

1
1  "^
M
t + (m^t   p^t)

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Log linearizing (41) around its steady state and up to an uninteresting con-
stant yields
"Mt    (m^t   p^t) + c^t = a2 {^t (45)
where a2 is such as \1 Qt = a2 {^t i.e. a2 = 1exp( 1 ) 1 because
1
 is the steady
state interest rate.
Equation (45) is the intertemporal optimality condition setting the marginal
rate of substitution between money and consumption equal to the opportunity
cost of holding money.
Log linearizing (42) around its steady state yields
n^t (a1 (   )  ) c^t (   ) (1  a1)

m^t   p^t + 1
1   "
M
t

+"Nt = w^t  p^t
(46)
Equation (46) is the condition for the optimal consumption-leisure arbitrage,
implying that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor
is equated to the real wage.
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6.4 Calibration and results ( = 6)
Table 4: Calibration and estimation of structural parameters13
Law Prior Posterior Posterior Standard Condence
mean deviation mean deviation interval
 beta 0:99 0:005 0:9922 0:0030 [0:9860; 0:9985]
 normal 6:0 0:05 5:9906 0:0500 [5:9105; 6:0723]
 normal 1:2 0:05 1:4075 0:0357 [1:3493; 1:4678]
 normal 1:0 0:05 1:0100 0:0498 [0:9322; 1:0996]
 beta 0:66 0:05 0:8224 0:0232 [0:7807; 0:8602]
" normal 6:0 0:05 6:0024 0:0500 [5:9211; 6:0829]
 beta 0:33 0:05 0:4700 0:0583 [0:3794; 0:5631]
b beta 0:4 0:05 0:3984 0:0508 [0:3180; 0:4752]
i beta 0:6 0:05 0:5781 0:0358 [0:5203; 0:6378]
 normal 3:5 0:05 3:5038 0:0499 [3:4128; 3:5846]
x normal 1:5 0:05 1:5280 0:0493 [1:4479; 1:6089]
a beta 0:8 0:075 0:9006 0:0248 [0:8641; 0:9425]
i beta 0:8 0:075 0:9882 0:0042 [0:9812; 0:9957]
p beta 0:8 0:075 0:8251 0:0255 [0:7849; 0:8667]
m beta 0:8 0:075 0:9352 0:0179 [0:9047; 0:9639]
n beta 0:8 0:075 0:7987 0:0759 [0:6862; 0:9152]
a invgamma 1 1 2:1607 0:2511 [1:7459; 2:5606]
i invgamma 1 1 0:5743 0:0675 [0:4415; 0:6864]
p invgamma 5 1 7:7275 0:7471 [6:4409; 8:9630]
m invgamma 1 1 1:4870 0:1059 [1:3021; 1:6521]
n invgamma 1 1 0:9438 0:2150 [0:3243; 1:6599]
Results are based on 10 chains, each with 100000 draws based on the Metropolis algorithm.
13See Apendix 6.6 for the prior and posterior distributions.
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6.5 Priors and posteriors ( = 2)
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The vertical line denotes the posterior mode, the grey line is the prior dis-
tribution, and the black line is the posterior distribution.
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6.6 Priors and posteriors ( = 6)
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6.7 Static analysis
The following table highlights the derivatives of the macro-coe¢ cients with re-
spect to , knowing that a1 and a2 are independent of ,  = 1:2, and   2.
@
@
ya
 a1(1 )(1+)
(( ( )a1)(1 )++)2 < 0
ym
 (1 )(1 a1)(++(1 ))
(( ( )a1)(1 )++)2 < 0
yc
 a1 log( "" 1 )(1 )2
(( ( )a1)(1 )++)2 < 0
ysm   11  (1 )(1 a1)(++(1 ))(( ( )a1)(1 )++)2 > 0
ysn
a1(1 )2
(( ( )a1)(1 )++)2 > 0
my
a1a2
 > 0
my+1
a1a2
 < 0
x a1
(1 )(1 )
1 +"
1 
 > 0
m
(1 )(1 a1)(1 )
1 +"
1 
 > 0
r   a1( a1( ))2 < 0
mp
(1 a1)
( a1( ))2 > 0
sp
a1
( a1( ))2 > 0
sm
1 a1
( a1( ))2

1  < 0
i 0
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